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Michael Brown 
Seton Hall Law Circuit Review 
A Right to Speedy Sentencing? Not so Fast. 
 
Introduction 
Imagine the feeling of finally knowing the outcome of what may be the most important 
moment of your life. All the stress and anxiety is finally over as you wait for a hearing to know 
how past actions will affect the upcoming years of your life. While most defendants are detained 
following a determination of guilt, a small number are released prior to sentencing.1 Some of 
these defendants hope to draw the process out for some time in an attempt to avoid incarceration; 
for others they may wish to know their fate at sentencing. For most, that hearing may not come 
for months or even years, creating a feeling of perpetually living in the past, thinking about the 
result of a criminal trial.   
Federal courts have in almost all cases performed extraordinarily well fulfilling their 
obligations in sentencing convicted defendants.2 In a small number of circumstances defendants 
sentencing proceedings are delayed. In these circumstances, victims and defendants are left 
feeling unresolved as they wait for their sentence. Such delays have detrimental outcomes for 
both the interests of the defendant and government in the criminal justice system.  
For close to sixty years, almost all federal courts have stated with little explanation that 
the right to speedy sentencing is encapsulated within the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy 
trial. Instead, this Note intends to demonstrate that such a right is captured in the Fifth 
                                                     
1 E.g Mark Motivans, Ph.D., Federal Justice Statistics 2010-Statisitcs Tables 
(http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10st.pdf) (Table 3.2, shows that 32% of defendants are released at the 
disposition of the case.)  
2 See Jason Gibson, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: A Surprising Success? 1998 U. Rich. Law Faculty Publications 
(Stating that while there are criticisms of Federal Guidelines for sentencing, many Judges find it the most 
appropriate approach.). 
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Amendment’s procedural due process clause, which requires the Government to provide certain 
procedures prior to depriving an individual of life, liberty or property.  
Part A of this Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in 1957 when the Court 
assumed arguendo that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial is applicable to a 
defendant’s right to speedy sentencing.3 Next this section will review the Third and Fifth Circuits 
decisions which maintained the Supreme Court’s assumption in applying the Sixth Amendment 
to oppressive delays in sentencing.4 Finally, Part A will explain the Second Circuit’s argument, 
in 2009, that a Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim, rather than a Sixth Amendment Claim, is 
more applicable to a defendant’s delay in sentencing.  
Part B of this Note will further expand the Second Circuit’s decision by looking briefly at 
the historical importance of a trial as it pertains to criminal sentencing.5 The United States took 
many aspects of the English legal system when forming a new nation, including the criminal trial 
system. By reviewing the common criminal trial practice, this Note seeks to explain that criminal 
sentencing is a distinct and separate part of the criminal trial, which does not lend itself to rights 
of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment and instead is better served by review under 
the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, this part will examine recent US legislation demonstrating 
Congress’s intent to not include sentencing while promulgating statutes regarding criminal trials.  
Lastly, Part C will examine why the Second Circuit’s application of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process clause in delays in sentencing may correct the extreme outcome of an application of 
the Sixth Amendment when applied to sentencing. As the Supreme Court stated in Strunk v. 
United States, the only acceptable outcome in a violation of the Sixth Amendment is a dismissal 
                                                     
3 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957). 
4 United States v. Campbell, 531 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1976). and Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3rd Cir. 
1987). 
5 United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184 (2009). 
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of the conviction with prejudice.6 Such a resolution to a delay in sentencing allows those who 
have pleaded guilty or have been convicted of a crime to proceed without punishment, which 
does not allow for retribution or other interests in criminal sentencing. Such an outcome, while 
beneficial for the defendant, is also adverse to the the government’s interests. Following the 
Second Circuit’s approach, a court may determine if a violation occurred and gauge the amount 
of prejudice the defendant incurred in the delay. If a violation is found in the sentencing 
proceedings the Second Circuit’s approach permits the court to reduce the potential sentence, 
which provides a balancing of interests between failing to cure a constitutional violation and 
dismissing the matter with prejudice. The reduction in sentence allows for the defendant to 
receive a lesser sentence as a result of prejudice while protecting the government’s interest in 
punishing those who are found guilty. 
Part A Effect of Pollard and Moving Forward  
 Defendants have challenged delays in sentencing in federal courts believing that their 
constitutional rights have been violated, with the vast majority of claims brought under the Sixth 
Amendment.7 First, this section will review the Supreme Court’s decision regarding delays in 
sentencing, that set much of the framework for how these issues are viewed today. Next, a 
review of decisions from both the Third and Fifth Circuits will show that both courts did not 
expand on the Supreme Court’s assumption regarding the application of the Sixth Amendment to 
sentencing delays. Lastly, an examination of the Second Circuit’s decision in 2009 provides a 
change in analysis and framework regarding sentencing delays.  
                                                     
6 U.S. v. Strunk, 412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973). 
7 Susan L. Thomas, J.D., When Does Delay in Imposing Sentencing Violate Speedy Trial Provision, 86 A.L.R.4th 
340 (1991).  
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of oppressive sentencing delays in Pollard v. 
United States.8 The defendant in this case was charged with and eventually pleaded guilty to the 
unlawful taking and embezzlement of a treasury check pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1702.9 Prior to 
sentencing, the defendant was previously incarcerated.10 While commending the defendant for 
his rehabilitation during his imprisonment, the Court stated that he would be placed on probation 
for three years.11 The sentence was placed on the record after the defendant had already left the 
courtroom and he was not given a copy of the order. 12 
 Two years after the imposition of the defendant’s probation, a bench warrant was issued 
by the trial judge after discovering the defendant violated the terms of his probation.13 Following 
his arrest, the defendant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.14 The defendant appealed 
the sentencing, claiming that his sentence of probation was invalid because he was not present 
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 43 and as a result his sentence of two years’ imprisonment was invalid.15 In 
his claim to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the imposition of two sentences for the 
same crime violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.16 Furthermore, the 
defendant asserted that the circumstances surrounding his sentencing violated his rights to a 
speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and that he was deprived due process of law under 
the Fifth Amendment.17  
                                                     
8 352 U.S. 354 (1957). 
9 Id. at 355. 
10 Id. (Defendant was serving a sentence in Minnesota for an unrelated crime and was scheduled to be released 
within weeks following the hearing.) 
11 Id. (Defendant’s probation was set to begin following his release from incarceration.) 
12 Id. (The Defendant was unaware of the sentence being placed on the record.) 
13 Id. at 356. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 357. 
16 Id. at 359. 
17 Id. 
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The Court examined the district court’s role in sentencing to determine if it had erred in 
its decision.18 Turning to the question of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment claim to 
sentencing the Court stated, “We will assume arguendo that sentence is part of trial for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment.”19 The Court went on to say that any such delay must prove to be 
oppressive or purposeful for a constitutional violation to have occurred.20 The Court found no 
such occurrence and therefore no constitutional violation.21 Lastly, the Court noted that the 
timing of sentencing is not at will for the judge in any case, but is rather governed by Rule 32(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.22  
 The issue was confronted by a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1976, when the Fifth 
Circuit decided United States v. Campbell.23 The court issued defendant, William Campbell, the 
maximum sentence permitted under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b).24 However, the 
sentence was suspended pending a study by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.25 The 
defendant was confined in a state jail when his conviction was affirmed following an appeal; 
however, he was wrongfully released after serving a previous sentence for an unrelated crime.26 
Campbell was taken in to federal custody more than four years following his release and 
was placed in technical custody at his home due to his severe medical condition.27 The court 
ordered study by the Bureau of Prisons was not completed until Campbell was taken into 
                                                     
18 Id. at 361. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 362. 
22 Id. at 361. (Finding that the Federal Rules on Criminal Procedure require the imposition of a sentence without 
unreasonable delay) 
23 531 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1976).  
24 Id. (The maximum penalty permitted under the statute was five years on each of the counts. The Defendant was 
ordered that the sentence was to be served consecutively) 
25 Id. (The Bureau was requested by the Court to conduct the study to determinate an appropriate sentence as a result 
of the Defendant’s muscular dystrophy.) 
26 Id. at 1335. (The state authorities who were confirming Campbell were served with a detainer notice, alerting 
them not to release Campbell at the end of his current sentence. Campbell was released and returned home.) 
27 Id. 
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custody.28 After the report was completed, Campbell was sentenced to three year’s probation, 
more than six years following the hearing with the District Court.29  
Much like the defendant in Pollard, Defendant Campbell claimed that the four-year delay 
in the imposition of his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial, F.R.C.P. 
Rule 32 and a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment.30 The Court quoted the 
Supreme Court that an “unreasonable delay in sentencing may constitute a violation of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.”31 The Court then went on to evaluate the 
delay in sentencing under the Barker v. Wingo32 four-prong test, which is the standard test to 
determine if a Sixth Amendment violation had occurred..33 The court examined the length of the 
delay; whether a defendant has asserted his Sixth Amendment right and whether prejudice to a 
defendant has resulted from the delay.34  
The Court found that the length of the delay was unreasonable and that there lacked any 
sufficient reason for the delay.35 It stated that the district court, while not appearing to have 
prejudiced the defendant by any intention, must review the record and make a determination.36 
The Fifth Circuit failed to expand or give any reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s assumption 
that sentencing was under the umbrella of the Sixth Amendment.37 Instead, the Court confined its 
review to the Sixth Amendment.38 
                                                     
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1334. 
30 Id. at 1335. 
31 Id. 
32 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1336.  
36 Id. (The Court found the District Court made a simple mistake in failing to schedule the sentencing at a proper 
time and noting was done with the intent to delay.) 
37 Pollard, 352 U.S at 361. 
38 Campbell, 531 F.2d at 1335. 
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Eleven years following the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Third Circuit reviewed Burkett v. 
Cunningham.39 The Defendant, Paul Burkett, raised two habeas corpus appeals due to a delay in 
sentencing following three Pennsylvania state court convictions.40 Burkett argued a violation 
occurred as a result of his continued custody in all three of his conviction.41 He stated that the 
delay in trial had violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and that 
due process violations have taken place.42 The Third Circuit noted that the right to a speedy trial 
is “a fundamental tenant of Anglo-American jurisprudence” insinuating to its importance.43  
The Third Circuit acknowledged that neither that court nor the Supreme Court had 
definitively held that the right to speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment applies to post-
verdict or post-conviction proceedings.44 Instead, the Third Circuit noted that both it and the 
Supreme Court have assumed arguendo that such a right is applicable.45 While the Court offered 
no explanation as to why it has continually assumed the right to speedy sentencing is 
encapsulated by the Sixth Amendment, it explicitly stated that the speedy trial clause applies 
from the time an accused is arrested or criminally charged, as well as through the sentencing 
phase of prosecution.46 The court even went on to state that the Tenth Circuit and all others that 
had addressed the issue have treated the Supreme Court’s assumption as established law or have 
continually perpetuated the Court’s assumption in Pollard.47  
                                                     
39 826 F.2d 1208. 
40 Id. at 1210. (One sentencing, which encompassed two separate convictions, was delayed two years and four 
months following trial. The Defendant had yet to be sentenced for the last conviction, after five and a half years 
following trial as well as two years after the district court stated that his right to a speedy trial would be violated if it 
did not occur within sixty days.) 
41 Id. at 1212. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1219. 
44 Id. at 1220. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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After stating that the court would examine the defendant’s claim under the Sixth 
Amendment, the court announced that the Barker v. Wingo factors were the appropriate test to 
determine if constitutional violation occurred as a result of the delay in sentencing.48 It also 
stated that if a constitutional violation is in fact found, it may not go unrectified, but instead must 
be cured.49 Lastly, the court stated that where the prejudice in delay may not be rectified, there is 
only one remedy applicable to such circumstances.50 The court cited to Strunk v. United States51 
in saying that “where the prejudice cannot be rectified, the remedy must be discharge from 
custody with prejudice to retrial”.52  
Applying the Barker factors, the court found that a constitutional violation had occured as 
a result of the delay.53 The court noted that all of the Barker factors weighed to some extent 
towards the defendant’s favor, including that the delay had resulted in prejudice.54 The court 
went on to compare the incredible length of the defendant’s delay in sentencing with other cases, 
which in most were not even half of that in the current case.55 Ultimately, the court found that no 
lesser remedy than that described in Strunk was appropriate for such a delay.56 The court released 
the defendant and discharged his convictions, with prejudice, as a result of the Sixth Amendment 
violation.57 
The Second Circuit decided to take a more in-depth review of the Six Amendment as it 
applies to delays in sentencing in United States v. Ray.58 Defendant, Shenna Deloache Ray, was 
                                                     
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 412 U.S. 434 (1973). 
52 826 F.2d at 1220. 
53 Id. at 1223. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1224. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1224-1225. 
58 578 F.3d 184 (2009). 
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convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.59 Ray pleaded 
guilty to the charge in 1991, however the case was remanded on direct appeal as both parties 
sought resentencing.60 Defendant Ray requested the District Court to review mitigating factors 
such as her familial circumstances at the time; that the crime she committed was a result of 
threats against her; and her current pregnancy.61 Unaware if a departure from the sentencing 
guidelines was proper, the District Court denied her request. However, during her appeal the 
Third Circuit held in United States v. Johnson62 that such circumstances allow for such a 
departure.63 It was then agreed upon by both parties that Ray would be resentenced pursuant to 
Johnson and a stipulation for the same was filed with the court.64 Unknown to the state, no 
further action was taken on the Defendant’s case for fifteen years.65 
Since that original sentencing date, Defendant Ray continued on with her life in a variety 
of areas.66 However, when she sought new employment she was requested to provide 
documentation concerning the result of her 1992 conviction.67 After requests to both the District 
Court and Second Circuit for documentation, she received a re-sentencing date in March 2008.68  
At the hearing, Ray’s counsel implored the court to consider a lenient sentence given the 
rehabilitation since her crime.69 After hearing arguments from both the government and Ray’s 
                                                     
59 Id. at 186. 
60 Id. (In 1992, the court held a sentencing hearing where Ray was categorized as a level thirteen offender pursuant 
to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines with a criminal history of 1. Pursuant to the mandatory sentencing guidelines, Ray 
could receive a punishment in the range of twelve to eighteen months) 
61 Id. at 187. 
62 964 F.2d 124 (1992). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (Defendant Ray gained lawful employment, enrolled in an associate’s program at a community college and 
paid all of her taxes, with the government conceding that she “reformed her lifestyle and achieved successful self-
rehabilitation”) 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 188. 
69 Id. 
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counsel concerning a possible violation of her right to a speedy trial, the District Court gave her a 
lenient sentence of one day imprisonment.70 The court also required that Ray serve three years of 
supervised release with a special condition that she spend six months in a halfway house.71 
Following her one day imprisonment, Ray immediately filed an appeal with the Second Circuit, 
arguing that her undue delay in sentencing violated her right to a speedy trial pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment and that there was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.72 
In its review of both the Fifth and Six Amendment Claims, the court reviewed previous 
determinations by courts presented with delays in sentencing.73 Finding little assistance in 
previous decisions, the court looked to the plain text of the Sixth Amendment for further 
guidance.74 The court quoting from United States v. Sprague75 stated, “The Constitution was 
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and 
ordinary meaning as distinguished from technical meaning.”76 With that in mind the court turned 
towards the meaning of the word trial, as understood by the general public.77 In review of 
previous court decisions, the court found that the word “trial” has generally been held as the 
determination of guilt or innocence of a defendant, as well as the facts required for the 
imposition of a sentence, but not the sentence itself.78  
Searching further for an explanation of the common usage and understanding of the word 
trial, the Second Circuit reviewed the writings of Sir William Blackstone, the famed English 
                                                     
70 Id. at 189. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 190. 
73 Id. at 192-194. 
74 Id. at 194. 
75 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931). 
76 578 F.3d at 194., quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). 
77 Id. at 194. 
78 Id. at 195. 
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legal scholar.79 The court found it instructive that Blackstone noted the separation of a trial and 
sentence in criminal prosecutions.80 Next, the court looked to early decisions of American courts 
that reflected the distinction between trial and sentencing.81 The court concluded that “the 
passage of two centuries since the Framing era has not changed the basic divide between trial 
and sentencing.”82  
The court then focused on American criminal procedure which developed in the 20th 
Century to further its examination of the Sixth Amendment’s application to the imposition of a 
criminal sentence.83 The court looked to the Federal Rules on Criminal Procedure for guidance, 
finding that the rules themselves exhibit a differentiation between trial proceedings and 
sentencing.84 Specifically, the court noted that Rules 23 through 31 directly pertain to trials, 
whereas both sentencing and judgment are addressed in Rule 32.85 The court stated “The 
structure of the Rules reflects an understanding that trials conclude with the announcement of a 
verdict of guilt or not guilty, and sentencing takes place after trial.”86  
The court then examined the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, in which Congress created time 
limitations to ensure that a defendant was deprived of their Sixth Amendment right.87 After 
review, the Court found that the Act does not specifically mention sentencing and creates no 
affirmative right to speedy sentencing.88 The Court concluded that “If trials were generally 
understood to include sentencing proceedings, we would expect the Speedy Trial Act to apply to 
                                                     
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. 195-196., See Kennedy v. Commonwealth 4 Va. 510, 510 (1826); Burgess v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 483, 486 
(1825); Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass.91, 94 n.6 (1819); Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391, 399 (1808) 
82 Id. at 196. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 197. 
88 Id.  
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those proceedings. That the Act contains no reference to sentencing whatsoever suggests that 
Congress did not consider sentencing proceedings to be components of criminal trials.”89 
Lastly, the court reviewed the interests of a defendant that are sought to be protected by 
the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause.90 The Supreme Court’s decision in Doggett v. 
United States91 recognized three primary concerns a defendant being delayed for trial.92 Those 
interests include: 1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) anxiety and concern of the accused; and 
3) the possibility that the accused defense will be impaired by dimming memories and loss of 
exculpatory evidence.93 The court found that the Eighth Circuit has already explained in Brooks 
v. United States94 many of these factors are not applicable to a defendant who is awaiting 
criminal sentencing.95  
First, the court noted that pretrial incarceration is not at issue because a defendant has 
already been convicted of the crime at issue and is simply awaiting punishment.96 The court then 
went on to state that a convicted defendant does not share the same kind or amount of anxiety 
and concern as does one who is awaiting trial.97 The anxiety and concern related to the Speedy 
Trial Clause arise of one who is presumptively innocent; who is suspicious as to the outcome of 
their matter.98 The Court noted that once a defendant has been found guilty the presumption of 
innocence is no longer present and while a defendant awaiting sentencing may still be under a 
                                                     
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
92 578 F.3d at 197. 
93 Id., citing Doggett 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992). 
94 423 F.2d 1149 (1970). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 197-198 
97 Id. at 198. (The Court finding its basis for this belief from the Eight Circuit’s review in Brooks v. United States, 
423 F.2d 1149 (1970)) 
98 Id. 
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cloud, it is one of public guilt.99 Lastly, the court concluded that the third factor may have the 
most profound impact on sentencing, however not one that is fatal.100 While the passage of time 
might impair a criminal defense, it does not foreclose the defendant to argue for leniency at 
sentencing.101 Accordingly, the court held that the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to a delay 
in sentencing proceedings.102  
The court, after noting that the concerns of a delay in trial are not applicable to those who 
are delayed in sentencing, recognized harms arising from any delays in sentencing 
proceedings.103 Specifically, the court found that a delay in sentencing leaves both the defendant 
and victim in a state of limbo, uncertain of the future.104 Furthermore, a delay also postpones the 
commitment of a defendant to federal institutions, which may result as a detrimental effect to any 
rehabilitation they may receive.105 The court stated that these interests should be protected.106  
Finding that the Fifth Amendment “has a limited role to play in protecting against 
oppressive delay” the court began its review of the Fifth Amendment’s role in a delay in 
sentencing proceedings.107  Looking again to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
32(b)(1) provides that “the court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay”, unless the 
court finds good cause to change such time limits prescribed by the rule.108 After a finding that 
the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to these circumstances, the court found that delays in 
                                                     
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 198-199. 
103 Id. at 198. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 199. (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977)). 
108 Id. at 199. 
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sentencing may amount to a violation of due process in the Fifth Amendment as a result of an 
individual being denied liberty.109  
One of the main reasons of the court’s determination that the Sixth Amendment is 
inapplicable to a delay in sentencing is the remedy. The court acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court has stated that the only remedy for a delay pursuant to a Sixth Amendment violation is a 
dismissal of the charges.110 Such a remedy may only be described as extreme as it would permit 
those who are found guilty of a crime to be vindicated of all charges with prejudice. The court 
noted that other courts have expressed that such a remedy is unsatisfactory.111 Specifically, the 
court found guidance from the Bozza v. United States decision.112 The court quoted the Bozza 
court, wherein it expressed its rejection of such a remedy, stating “its rejection of the ‘doctrine 
that a prisoner, whose guilt is established, by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment 
altogether, because the court committed an error in passing the sentence”.113 
Finding that such a remedy is extreme, the court found that sentencing delay violations 
when viewed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment permits the court to avoid such a result.114 
Instead, the court fashioned a two-prong test, taking what it believed to be two of the most 
crucial factors from the Barker court to evaluate delays in sentencing.115 The court stated that 
when determining if a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurred due to a delay in sentencing, 
the court must determine 1) the reasons for delay as well as; 2) the prejudice to the accused.116 
Providing some clarification to the test, the court noted that while prejudice is necessary, 
                                                     
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 193. 
111 Id. at 193-194. 
112 330 U.S. 160. 
113 Id. at 166. (quoting In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242. 260 (1894)) 
114 578 F.3d at 194. 
115 Id. at 199. 
116 Id. 
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prejudice alone is not enough to warrant a finding of a violation.117 Instead, a defendant asserting 
a claim must evidence prejudice and an unjustified reason for the delay in order to prove a due 
process violation.118 These considerations must be weighed and evaluated together rather than 
independently, as they must be considered related factors.119 
 Turning back to the circumstances before the court, it applied the first prong of the newly 
promulgated test to defendant Ray’s facts.120 In reviewing the reasons for delay, the court found 
guidance from the Supreme Court that while “deliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs 
heavily against the prosecution, more neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
weigh less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for 
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.”121 The court 
found that the reason for the delay was negligence on behalf of the government, allowing it to 
languish for close to fifteen years.122 The court also considered whether the defendant should 
bear any burden for such a delay, but reiterated that neither the defendant or their counsel have 
an affirmative duty to seek criminal prosecution or sentencing.123 
 The court then sought to determine the degree of prejudice the defendant faced as a result 
of the delay.124 The amount of prejudice may not simply be minimal but instead must be 
substantial and demonstrable for a violation to be found.125 In finding prejudice, the court 
                                                     
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 200. 
121 Id. (quoting Vermont v. Brillion, 129 S. Ct. at 1290 (2009)) 
122 Id. (The court noted that the government conceded that the claim was left stale for that period of time.) 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 201. 
125 Id. 
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reviewed what transpired in the defendant’s life during the fifteen year delay in proceedings.126 It 
found that since being convicted the defendant had been rehabilitated.127 
 As the last part of the Second Circuit’s approach, the court balanced both the reason for 
delay and the prejudice Ray experienced as a result of the delay.128 Finding that even while the 
reason for delay was the negligence of the government, something that should not be weighed 
heavily, the Court found the prejudice significant.129 The Court found that a due process 
violation existed.130 It reasoned that Ray’s sentence of residing in a hallway house for six months 
would only uproot her successful rehabilitation and chose to vacate that part of her sentence.131 
However, the court pursuant to its determination that the Fifth Amendment is proper in these 
circumstances, did not dismiss Ray’s conviction with prejudice. 
 Since the Ray decision, some courts132 have chosen not to adopt the Second Circuit’s 
approach when determining a delay in sentencing. Upon further review, many courts may be 
inclined to adopt the Second Circuit’s two-prong test to determine if a due process violation 
exists, allowing those courts to determine a more appropriate remedy rather than dismissal of the 
charges.  
 While many courts have failed to adopt the Second Circuit’s approach, it has been 
received with some thought from others. Specifically, Circuit Judge Gruender, in his concurring 
opinion in United States v. Thompson, found the Second Circuit’s review of the Sixth 
                                                     
126 Id. 
127 Id. (The Court found that since her arrest that led to the issue, that she has since remarried, raised a family, has 
been steadily employed, obtained a higher education and did not commit any further criminal acts. It felt that such 
progress would possibly be undermined by the prejudice the defendant would face by imposing a sentence.) 
128 Id. at 202. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 203. 
132 See United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599, 609 (1st Cir. 2015); SEC v. Boyd, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43317 
(2012). 
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Amendment as it applies to sentencing to be rather convincing.133 Judge Gruender believed the 
Constitution was written to be understood by its plain meaning and the terminology used in the 
text should be construed as it was used in everyday language.134 Judge Gruender noted, as the 
Second Circuit found, that trial and sentencing proceedings are and were often bifurcated. This 
led him to believe that the Fifth, rather than the Sixth Amendment, is more applicable to such 
delays, as sentencing does not have a place within the plain meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  
 A brief review of history will illuminate both the roles of juries in sentencing, as well as 
to provide a better understanding of what a criminal trial contemplated in early American 
jurisprudence. Providing a broad historical background can assist in determining the applicability 
of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Sixth Amendment as it applies to delays in sentencing.  
Part B- Historical Aspect 
 Providing a broader historical setting to the time period when the Constitution was 
written permits a greater understanding of how criminal juries functioned in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries, as well as the limitations in their duties. This section will also review 
legislation from the twentieth century, both the Speedy Trial Act and Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to demonstrate Congress’s separation of the trial and sentencing phases in criminal 
prosecution.  
 In its review of the Sixth Amendment and its application to delays in sentencing, the 
Second Circuit examined the text of the Sixth Amendment to determine its meaning in light of 
the historical context when it was passed.135 The court looked at the text of the Constitution on 
the assumption that “the Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and 
                                                     
133 713 F.3d 388, 396-97 (8th Cir. 2013). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 196. 
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phrases were used in their normal and ordinary meaning as distinguished from technical 
meaning.136 The Second Circuit’s textual review of the Sixth Amendment, rather than assuming 
arguendo that it applies to sentencing, supports the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the 
issue.  
A review of history reveals the word “trial” refers to the stage at which a defendant’s case 
is unearthed and facts are found in an attempt to determine if that individual is guilty.137 For 
those in the legal community it often refers to the stage at which we present the issues of both 
fact and law before a factfinder. Specifically, Black’s Law Dictionary refers to a trial as “the 
judicial determination of issue between parties to an action, whether they be issues of law or fact, 
before a court that has jurisdiction”138 It appears that the word trial encompasses that specific 
function in the criminal prosecution, something that sentencing is not part of. Furthermore, it 
provides some clarification that there was a distinction between the determination of guilt and 
sentencing.  
While these current definitions may shed some light on the common understanding of the 
word specifically invoked in the Sixth Amendment, a brief historical recall of the English legal 
system will only further exhibit that both trial and sentencing are different phases within the 
criminal prosecution of a defendant. Review of the history of the English trial from the 17th and 
18th centuries will assist to exhibit that the main purpose of a trial at that time period was for the 
discovery of facts and the determination of guilt of a defendant.  
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Trials were introduced in the early 13th century and were deemed valuable at the time of 
the signed of the Magna Carta.139 During this time period, William Blackstone noted:  
But the founders of the English laws have with excellent forecast contrived, that 
no man should be called to answer to the king for any capital crime, unless upon 
the preparatory accusation of twelve or more of his fellow subjects, the grand 
jury: and that the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of 
indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the 
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen, 
and superior to all suspicion.140   
 
Such a remark shows that the jury was used for the purpose of seeking the truth of the 
claims set forth before the court.  
The advent of trials was not absent from the early American colonies. Much of the 
English common law was adopted as a result to fill the need of a lack of substantive and 
procedural law in early American times. While not all of the common law was used it has been 
stated “The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our 
ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they 
brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation”. 141 One 
of the English common law elements that was promoted at this time was a public trial. However, 
one additional aspect that was permitted of these procedures was that in comparison to English 
juries, early American juries were permitted to make findings of both fact and law.142  
 With the principle purpose of the common law trial well founded, a review of a juries’ 
role in sentencing is also crucial in understanding the inapplicability of the Sixth Amendment to 
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sentencing proceedings. As previously stated, juries were used to review facts and law in order to 
return a more insightful and just verdict for a defendant.143 However, what remains clear through 
reviewing the history of trials is that sentencing proceedings were distinct from a jury’s 
determination of guilt.  
 Turning once again to Blackstone for guidance of the English trial system, his writings 
clearly evidence that imposing a sentence upon the defendant was a distinct proceeding, one that 
is separate from the trial’s function. He notes, “We are now to consider the next stage of criminal 
prosecution, after trial and conviction are past, in such crimes and misdemeanors, as are either 
too high or too low to be included within the benefit of clergy: which is that of judgment”.144 
Blackstone states, however, that in certain circumstances a technical hearing would be 
appropriate in which a defendant would be permitted to present evidence to support a mistrial or 
to request reprieve of punishment.145 This hearing was separate from the determination of facts 
and guilt, which was established at trial, leading to believe that this was the onset of what would 
be sentencing hearings, a separate proceeding from the trial.  
 Sentencing hearings or the earliest form of such proceedings appeared to gain some 
ground in the late 18th century, as defendants were permitted to submit affidavits to combat the 
proposed harsh punishment a defendant was set to face.146 The purpose of these affidavits was 
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not to challenge the final determination of the trial but instead to present evidence as to why a 
punishment should not be imposed on the defendant.147 English scholar J. Chitty stated: 
 When the defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor in the King’s Bench . . 
. And as the prosecutor is only permitted on the trial to produce such of his 
evidence as is sufficient to convict the defendant. Therefore, upon this motion 
affidavits may be read in aggravation of the offence and on the defendant’s part 
in mitigation, as the defendant may by affidavit lessen the degree of his guilt. 
Each party must, therefore, then come prepared with affidavits disclosing all the 
circum- stances of the case, taking care however not to attempt to dispute the 
propriety of the verdict.148 
 Such a determination was made by the court, not the jury, in imposing the sentence, 
further separating the trial function from sentencing.  The separation of functions between the 
judge and jury notes that distinct proceedings after trial were promulgated to relate directly to 
sentencing of a defendant, something that the jury in the trial did not encompass.  
 Judges’ role in sentencing was also found in the late 18th century in the United States. 
Judges were permitted in misdemeanor cases to apply discretion in sentencing defendants based 
upon the facts presented to the court.149 However, this discretion was soon applied to all types of 
crimes. When Congress promulgated the first federal legislated criminal laws, judges were often 
given their own discretion to apply the sentence that they believed was just and deserving.150 It 
evidences a separate proceeding in which courts, by means of judges, would make an 
independent decision in a separate proceeding from trial that pertained only to sentencing. 
 Early American courts also noted the separation of trial and post-conviction proceedings. 
In these cases, as the Second Circuit noted, motions were made after conviction and heard in a 
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separate proceeding.151 The proceedings were to determine facts or claims regarding the 
imposition of a certain sentence. Some of these motions also claimed that the trial was unjust, 
arguing that a new trial was warranted.152 The court notes that the determination of these motions 
or hearing was not heard by the jury but instead simply by the judge.153 Therefore, it appears that 
judges, rather than juries, had a distinct role in sentencing proceedings. That role being the 
determination of a specific sentence based upon the juries’ determination of guilt.  
 While trials, by means of juries, were used to determine facts and law of claims against 
defendants as well as provide a determination of guilt, its role was not one of sentencing. Instead, 
that role was with the court and may be subject to the discretion of the judge who would hear 
facts in a separate proceeding as to why the defendant should receive the proposed punishment. 
Such a difference is well noted in review of the Sixth Amendment as strict constructionists, like 
the Second Circuit, reviewed the text of the amendment at the time and context of the founders 
who wrote it.154 A review of history demonstrates that the word trial does not by itself 
encompass sentencing proceedings, thereby suggesting the text of the Sixth Amendment 
inapplicable to such proceedings.  
 The separation of the trial phase and sentencing proceedings continually was noted by 
legislation through the 20th century. Specifically, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
was enacted in 1946 by the Federal courts, notes the difference by the organization of the rules. 
Title VI of the rules are under the heading of “trial”, Rules 23 through 31 address the this phase 
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of a criminal prosecution, including juries, 155 testimony156 and the jury verdict. 157 Whereas, Title 
VII is titled post-conviction proceedings which refers to all proceedings that occur after trial.158 
Specifically, Rule 32 relates to sentencing and judgment in which the court should review facts 
and circumstances surrounding the defendant in applying the appropriate sentence.159 It would 
appear from the structure and organization of the Rules that the courts who promulgated the 
same noted a distinction between trials and sentencing.   
 Lastly, Congress enacted legislation in in 1974 to combat and provide guidance to delays 
in trial that would violate the Sixth Amendment. The Act provides time limitations in which each 
stage of the criminal prosecution and trial should be completed. However, what remains clear 
from the text of the Act is that in no place does Congress refer to sentencing or sentencing 
proceedings. By applying the basic principles of statutory interpretation we must look to the text 
of the legislation to determine Congress’s true intent, or simply referred to by the Supreme Court 
as the plain meaning rule.160 As the Supreme Court has stated “We begin with the familiar canon 
of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the 
statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive”.161 Thus, while it appears that there is no contrary meaning 
Congress’s intent in passing such legislation, it would appear that it did not seek to include 
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sentencing in the Act to ensure that defendants did not succumb to prejudice by a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.162  
 Review of early American trials and recent legislative acts relating to criminal procedure 
provides insight as to how trial and sentencing are separate criminal proceedings. By establishing 
the separation of the proceedings the Second Circuit of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court 
may have overlooked the applicability of the Fifth Amendment as it applies to sentencing. Had 
the Supreme Court undertaken the task of searching for the meaning of the text of the Sixth 
Amendment at the time of its inception, they may have found that the founders looked to cure 
delays in trials rather than sentencing proceedings by means of the Sixth Amendment.   
 While a review of the meaning of the word trial and history of sentencing proceedings 
may appear to be trivial, it could have a profound impact upon the remedy if a constitutional 
violation exists. Currently, the remedy for such a violation is a dismissal of the defendant’s 
charges with prejudice. However, if courts were to believe that issue is encapsulated in the Fifth 
Amendment, a less severe remedy may be provided that protects the interests of both the 
government and the defendant.  
Part C- Barker and Strunk 
 Section C of this Note seeks to demonstrate the current remedy fashioned by the courts 
may be perceived as a harsh remedy by members in the legal community and one that courts 
seek to avoid.  A review of two Supreme Court decisions will evidence the reasoning behind the 
remedy, as well as the factors the courts use in their determination.163 Finally, this section will 
address the public policy concerns, regarding sentencing that are threatened by such a remedy.  
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Part C-I- Barker and Strunk 
The United States Federal Courts, including the Supreme Court, have encountered Sixth 
Amendment claims in which defendants have claimed that the right to a speedy trial has been 
denied by oppressive pre-trial delays. Concerned regarding the liberties of the accused 
defendants, courts have found that when a Sixth Amendment violation exists, dismissal of the 
charges is the only resolution.164 While such a remedy may assist in dealing with the issues 
arising during pre-trial delays, or even those at trial, the remedy is adverse to the modern goals of 
sentencing by permitting guilty defendants to escape punishment. By following the Second 
Circuit’s approach in applying the Fifth Amendment to unlikely and distinct circumstances of 
delays in sentencing proceedings, the approach allows courts to fashion an equitable remedy for 
such delays while maintaining the principles in sentencing convicted defendants.  
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Barker was one of the first to note that the remedy for a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial must be the dismissal of the charges 
against the defendant. The Barker Court was addressing a Sixth Amendment claim from a 
defendant who was charged with murder.165 The defendant’s trial was delayed for over five years 
as a result of a co-defendant’s charge for the same crime, which required six trials as a result of 
several deficiencies.166 Furthermore, the defendant requested a continuance of his own trial for 
several reasons.167 After more than five years the defendant was convicted and given a life 
sentence.168 Feeling as though he was prejudiced by the delay, the defendant asserted a Sixth 
Amendment claim.169 
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 In evaluating the defendant’s claim, the Court noted that there were numerous concerns 
regarding a defendant who is delayed in awaiting trial.170 The Court also developed the four-
prong test, that has since been used by the majority of courts in determining if a Sixth 
Amendment did occur.171 Lastly, the Court also noted that because the right to a speedy trial is so 
crucial to a defendant, dismissal of such charges is a proper remedy.172 Realizing that such a 
remedy is severe the Court stated “this is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a 
defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. Such a 
remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only 
possible remedy”.173  
 The Barker Court stated that dismissal was the only possible remedy, however the 
Supreme Court was against faced with the question only a year after in Strunk v. United States. 
In that case the Court was presented with affirming its decision of dismissal due to a Sixth 
Amendment claim, when the defendant was delayed ten months before appearing for trial.174 The 
government claimed that the delay in trial was not oppressive, however Court of Appeals found 
that the delay was not the fault of the defendant.175 As a result of the prejudice, the Court of 
Appeals found that a Sixth Amendment violation did exist and noted that the traditional remedy 
was dismissal of the convicted and charges.176  
 Believing that the Barker court only set forth the four-prong test to determine if a 
violation did occur and not the remedy, the Court of Appeals fashioned its own practical 
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remedy.177 The court determined that the case should be remanded with the instruction that the 
defendant be sentenced while crediting the time from the defendant’s indictment and the date of 
arraignment.178 The Court of Appeals acknowledging the extreme outcome of the remedy stated, 
“Perhaps the severity of that remedy has caused courts to be extremely hesitant in finding a 
failure to afford a speedy trial”.179 On review the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
determination and held that in fact the Barker decision was correct in finding that the appropriate 
remedy was dismissal.180  
 Thus, at the sentencing phase, such a violation would occur when a defendant has already 
been convicted and not awaiting trial. Meaning that a defendant has already either admitted to 
such a crime and pleaded guilty or has been found guilty by a jury of their peers. A violation of 
the Sixth Amendment as it applies to sentencing would permit a convicted defendant to simply 
be released as a result of delay. Such a resolution is squarely against the role of sentencing in the 
American Justice system. Furthermore, such a resolution appears to be at odds with the public 
policy reasons promulgated by legal scholars.  
Part C-II-Public Policy for Criminal Punishment 
 While it has been disputed by both courts and legal experts, there are four main reasons 
or principles as to why the American criminal system punishes those who have been found guilty 
of a crime.181 These principles include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and 
rehabilitation.182 It is true that many of these principles have been called into question over 
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decades from sentencing and criminal statistics183; however, they remain the most common 
categorical reasons as to why society believes in the importance of sentencing those who have 
been found guilty of a crime. Dismissal of convictions of defendant certainly impedes if not goes 
against all four policy reasons for sentencing.  
 Deterrence is the general theory that postulates that the increasing fear or apprehension 
from punishment in society deters members of society as a whole from committing crimes.184 
Thus, criminal sentencing and punishment is intended to deter convicted defendants from 
recidivating or returning to their previous course of pattern.185 Deterrence is categorized as either 
general or specific.186 General deterrence refers to the threat of criminal punishment that is aimed 
to deter the general public, while specific deterrence is aimed to discourage the individual from 
repeating his’ or hers’ criminal behavior.187 Even more applicable to the issue of this Note, 
deterrence has been said to be most effective when the administration of justice is done with 
certainty, swiftness and severity.188  
 A delay in sentencing alone violates many of the ideologies of deterrence in punishing 
those who are found guilty. A delay would certainly not be swift nor certain as a defendant is left 
waiting to see what the result to the criminal proceeding will bring. However, a dismissal 
pursuant to the Barker and Strunk courts simply would abolish any role in the justice system 
from specifically deterring that individual from committing another crime. Instead, these 
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defendants would face no punishment for crimes committed and while the thought of having to 
experience another criminal prosecution may arise to a level of deterrence, it is certainly not 
equal to that of having a sentence imposed.  
 Another strong principle in criminal sentencing is incapacitation, or the use of sentencing 
to restrain criminals from reentering society. The restraint of these criminals attempts to limit the 
amount of crime taking place in society by ensuring those who have already been convicted of 
crime do not continue to do so.189 Physical incarceration serves this purpose of reducing crime by 
excluding those in society who commit it.190 By allowing defendants, who have been convicted 
by a jury, to escape sentencing due to a delay in the sentencing proceedings goes against the 
heart of the incapacitation principle. The result would allow those individuals to remain in the 
general population. By allowing these individuals to remain in society it creates the possibility 
that they may continually contribute to unlawful behavior.  
 The third principle and the most often criticized is rehabilitation of the criminal defendant 
by means of punishment. Rehabilitation generally assumes that society is the “root cause” of 
criminality.191 Under this principle crime is predominately a product of societal factors and is 
determined by such factors like poverty, racial discrimination and lack of employment 
opportunities.192 The rehabilitation model of criminal sentencing had its greatest effect on society 
in the 1960s and 1970s.193 However, since that time this principle has come under attack by 
many, including the courts as simply being unworkable and ineffective.194 Justice Scalia has 
stated “Well, I thought that modern penology has abandoned that rehabilitation thing, and they—
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they no longer call prisons reformatories or – or whatever, and punishment is the – is the 
criterion now. Deserved Punishment for the crime”.195 Regardless of sentiment and controversy 
surrounding the rehabilitation policy of sentencing, it has remained an interest by those who look 
to take a more utilitarian view of the criminal justice system. In more recent years, a utilitarian 
resurgence has occurred with many scholars taking the perspective that correctional treatment 
programs can successfully reduce crime in society.196  
 The harsh remedy required by the Barker and Strunk holdings combat the very idea 
behind rehabilitating convicted defendants by allowing for a dismissal of the charges due to a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment as applied to sentencing. A dismissal of the charges would 
allow defendants to avoid any treatment programs that the court may find suitable in sentencing 
the defendant based upon the crime they committed. While rehabilitation has come under attack 
from several scholars, dismissal of the charges does not allow the courts to assess what possible 
remedies in sentencing may assist the defendant with life after punishment. Treatment programs 
such as probation, community service or even diversion programs may not be administered as a 
result of delay in sentencing.  
 The last policy reason for criminal sentencing is on the opposite end of the spectrum in 
comparison to the three utilitarian policies listed above. Instead, Retributivists seek to sentence 
those convicted of crimes for the purpose of retribution for their acts towards victims and society 
in general. Sometimes referred to as “moral deserts”, individuals who believe in this ideology 
find that the commission of a crime is itself sufficient justification for punishment.197 Some have 
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also stated that retribution also serves the purpose of teaching those within society of what 
constitutes acts that lack morals and are damaging to the society as a whole.198  
 Following the precedent of the courts addressing Sixth Amendment violations, such a 
extreme remedy when a violation is found forgoes the retributionist theory of allowing those who 
have committed “moral horrors” to return to society without punishment. Dismissing charges of 
a convicted defendant leaves that individual without facing the punishment and may leave those 
who were affected by the defendant’s crimes, especially victims, feeling as though the criminal 
justice system failed to find justice.199  
 What remains clear is punishment regardless of the ideology behind it serves an 
important purpose within the criminal justice system, one that a dismissal of charges against a 
convicted defendant lies directly adverse to. The Courts who have promulgated these remedies 
have addressed the sheer dissatisfaction with the result stating that it is “serious consequence”.200 
By adopting the Second Circuit’s approach to sentencing, many of these concerns and ideologies 
may remain unaffected and promoted by permitting the court to simply alter the sentence of the 
defendant rather than disposing of the same.201 The approach allows for courts to gauge the 
amount of prejudice that an individual faced by the delay and reduce the sentence as they believe 
in the interests of justice. While not the sole intention behind finding the Fifth Amendment is 
applicable to post-conviction sentencing delays such an approach would allow for the four 
policies of punishment listed above to still be served. Furthermore, it would allow a defendant to 
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be “given credit” for any delay, allowing for a unique sentence that addresses what punishment 
may assist in allowing for these individuals to return to society in a more productive manner.  
If courts adopted the Second Circuit’s approach it would allow defendants to still be 
sentenced, while being able to look at the totality of the circumstances, including those of the 
court to fashion the most reasonable remedy and serve the interest of justice. As the Second 
Circuit did in Ray, they first looked to their two-prong test to see if a violation did occur as a 
result of any delay at the sentencing proceeding.202 Then, the Court reviewed the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant throughout the delay, allowing the Court to determine what were the 
effects of the criminal prosecution on the individual.203  
Realizing that the defendant had made great strides towards resuming a normal life and 
role in society the Court was able to fashion a remedy that allowed for the justice system to 
maintain the principles set forth above, while providing punishment that would not hinder or 
impede Ray’s positive steps.204 In its review, the Court found that Ray had assumed a positive 
role in society by remarrying, having children, abiding laws and even went on to higher 
education.205 Ray was sentenced to supervised released, or probation, with a special condition 
that she spend six months in a halfway house.206 The Court found that the whole sentence should 
not be dismissed, but instead adjusted to permit Ray to avoid having to leave her rehabilitated 
life to reside in a hallway house.207  
Another potential concern of the harsh remedy for a violation of the Sixth Amendment is 
fear that courts are unwilling to find a violation due to the idea that it could create a potential 
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windfall.208 The Strunk Court noted that such a remedy may dissuade judges from finding such a 
violation realizing that in essence letting a guilty defendant be released without punishment.209 
The unwillingness of judges to find such violations is an injustice in which the defendant must 
face alone, who regardless of the time period of the delay or degree of prejudice must still submit 
to the court for punishment. The Second Circuit’s approach permits judges to still impose a 
sentence upon the defendant despite a constitutional violation, while lessening it if necessary for 
prejudice. Such an approach would cut directly to the fear of a windfall to these individuals 
speak of.  
The reasoned approach by the Second Circuit allows any court who adopts such an 
approach to avoid the “unsatisfactorily severe” outcome of simply allowing a convicted 
defendant to go unpunished after being convicted.210 Instead courts would be permitted under the 
Second Circuit’s Fifth Amendment approach to craft their own sentence that would permit an 
equitable result to the defendant while maintaining the principles behind sentencing. Defendants 
would still face a punishment, if the court felt it justified, allowing them to be incapacitated, 
deterred, rehabilitated and would be punished fulfilling the retribution theory that some hold dire 
to the criminal justice system. Thus the Second Circuit’s approach falls more squarely in line 
with the interest of criminal sentencing, while permitting the defendant to have an altered 
sentence based upon the circumstances of his or her life.  
Conclusion 
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 Federal Courts have done an extraordinary job in timely sentencing defendants who have 
been convicted by a trial or those who have pleaded guilty to the crimes alleged against them. 
However, there remains those rare cases in which defendants are left waiting for the imposition 
of their sentence. Some of these defendants are not permitted to proceed in their lives as a result 
of these delays and the government must face the harsh remedy if a violation is found under the 
Sixth Amendment.  
 The Second Circuit was correct in their holding that the Fifth Amendment is applicable to 
sentencing proceedings after review of what is commonly understood by the word trial. By 
reviewing the role of trials as trier of facts and law in the late 17th century, it provides guidance 
that the role did not extend to sentencing of a defendant. Instead, like English courts the U.S. 
legislature permitted judges to have a distinct role in sentencing, allowing for defendants to 
present facts as to why they should receive a more lenient sentence. This proceeding was one 
independent of trials in convicting the defendant and provides context that at the time of 
ratification of the Sixth Amendment that the early stages of sentencing hearing were present. 
Furthermore, an examination of legislation in the 20th century only bolstered the theory that 
sentencing is viewed by the majority as a separate proceeding, one that is distinct from the trial 
process. Both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Speedy Trial Act show 
Congress’s separation of trial and sentencing.  Such a review shows support for these 
circumstances to be reviewed under the Fifth Amendment.  
 The Wingo and Strunk Courts went on to apply the only remedy that was available to a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, dismissal of all charges. Such a remedy when applied to those 
who have claimed that they have been prejudiced by a delay in sentencing is directly adverse to 
the interests in imposing punishment on those who have been convicted of a crime. Such a result 
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of a criminal prosecution is at arms with the four general principles of punishment. The proposed 
approach by the Second Circuit permits courts to avoid the outcome in which a convicted 
defendant may completely avoid punishment as a result of a post-conviction delay.  
The Second Circuit promulgated the two-prong test to examine if a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment occured as a result of the delay. If a violation is found, then the Court would be 
permitted to alter or fashion a new sentence to varying degrees based upon the amount of 
prejudice the defendant faced. If other courts were to adopt the Second Circuit’s approach it 
would allow defendants to be given relief as a result of prejudice, while maintaining the purpose 
of criminal sentencing.  
 In conclusion the application of the Second Circuit’s approach provides a workable 
framework in reviewing claims of delays in sentencing. Not only does it provide a court a 
practical test but provides a framework for the government to avoid the harsh remedy of the 
Strunk Court by applying the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. If more courts were willing 
to review the Constitutional Amendment in the same manner as the Second Circuit, they would 
find that not only is the Fifth Amendment proper, but would provide a more workable remedy 
that benefits that of both the government and even the defendant.  
